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I. INTRODUCTION

Immediately after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), much of the
commentary was about Congress' scatter-gun approach, firing at so many different
targets at once to prompt better corporate fmancial reporting and disclosure. Executives,
outside directors, lawyers, accountants, analysts, and others gained new obligations. 1 For
the most part, these groups now seem to have adjusted to their new regimes without all
that much difficulty or lingering complaint, perhaps because the changes were never
really as draconian as portrayed .

• Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington D.C.
I. Academic commentaries on SOX are voluminous, from the harshly critical (e.g., Roberta Romano,
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE 1.J. 1521 (2005)) to the
mildly complimentary (e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric. Light
Reform (and it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915 (2003)), and onto the more thoroughly supportive
(e.g., Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U.
1.Q. 449 (2002)).
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Today, the vocal criticism is largely reserved for just one piece of the legislation:
the internal controls requirement found in section 404, which in some circles has become
almost synonymous with SOX itself. Doubts about the balance of costs and benefits and.
whether the result will be increased de-listings and going private transactions to avoid
404's burdens have made this the portion of the Act that has encountered the most
political resistance. 2 The tone of these complaints is that 404's requirements are new,
radical, and ill-considered. Until recently, at least, the internal controls requirements have
received less attention from legal academics than many other salient aspects of the
legislation. 3
Revisiting section 3.4.2 of Clark's Corporate Law 4 ('Duty of Care as
Responsibility for Systems") reminds us, however, that the internal controls story
actually goes back many decades, and that many of the strategic issues that are at the
heart of section 404 have long been contentious. My Article will briefly update Clark's
account through the late 1980s and 1990s before returning to Sarbanes-Oxley and
rulemaking thereunder by the SEC and the newly created Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board ("PCAOB"). My main point builds on one of Clark's but digs deeper.
Internal controls requirements, whether federal or state, are incoherent unless and until
one articulates clearly for whose benefit they exist, and to what end. There are, in fact, a
number of competing articulations. The failure to identify a single and coherent rationale
creates significant uncertainty, which has been exploited by players in the legal,
accounting, consulting, and information technology fields. Companies are probably
spending more time and resources on 404 compliance than a reasonable reading of the
legislation and the rules necessarily requires, heavily influenced by those who gain from
issuer over-compliance. This rent-seeking compromises the political viability and
substantive quality of what is at the heart a beneficial statutory reform.

2. See William 1. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of "Going Private"
(Emory Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 05-4, 2005), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=672761.
3. Exceptions include Larry Cata Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing
Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 327; Lawrence A. Cunningham, The
Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud. Terrorism and Other Ills, 291. CORP. L. 267 (2004). My
contribution along these lines, which is more about behavior and incentives than the actual design of internal
controls, is Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial
Scandals About Self-Deception. Deceiving Others. and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. LJ. 285
(2004). There are, of course, now many practitioner-oriented books and articles. E.g., ROBERT R. MOELLER,
SARBANES OXLEY AND THE NEW INTERNAL AUDITING RULES (2004); MICHAEL 1. RAMOS, How To COMPLY
WITH SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNAL CONTROL (2004).
Economists have done a great deal of work to assess the impact of section 404, including studying stock price
reactions to control deficiency disclosures, questions of which investor classes benefit from such disclosure, etc.
E.g., Michael Alles & Srikant Datar, How Do You Stop the Booksfrom Being Cooked? A Management Control.
Perspective on Financial Accounting Standard Setting and the Section 404 Requirements of the Sarbanes Oxley
Act, I INT'L 1. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 119 (2004); Weili Ge & Sarah McVay, The Disclosure of Material
Weaknesses in Internal Controls After the Sarbanes Oxley Act, 19 ACCT. HORIZONS 137 (2005); Stephen Bryan
& Steven Lilien, Characteristics of Firms with Material Weaknesses in Internal Control: An Assessment of
Section 404 of Sarbanes Oxley (Mar. 2005) (unpublished paper, available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=682363).
4. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986).
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II. CLARK'S COMMENTARY

Section 3.4.2 addresses the board of directors' monitoring duties with respect to
potential corporate misconduct. It begins with an extended discussion of Graham v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 5 where the Delaware Supreme Court famously refused to impose
liability on the directors for inattention with regard to illegal price-fixing behavior at the
mid-manager level absent some affirmative showing that the directors were on specific
notice of a problem. After critiquing the court's reasoning, Clark offers one possible
justification for the result: in so far as the shareholders of the company are concerned, the
extent of compliance with law is reaIly a matter of business judgment, because ex ante a
positive expected value to noncompliance sometimes exists. A monitoring model
designed solely to promote compliance as such does not really fit within corporate law
(i.e., shareholder protection) as commonly understood, but should instead, if at all, be
connected to the legislation that imposes the underlying legal obligations. 6
But Clark then says that this critique does not apply with respect to one particular
kind of compliance regime: internal accounting controls. "Not having such a system
might very well be thought to result in a risk of injury to shareholders that no reasonable
director would normally incur,"7 and thus accounting controls present a distinguishable
issue from legal compliance programs generally. At this point, his attention shifts
("ironically," he says) from state corporate law to federal law, specificalIy the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). Enacted in the aftermath of the Watergate
controversy, the FCPA added to the Securities Exchange Act a specific requirement in
section l3(b)(2) that public companies both maintain accurate books and records (with no
materiality or intent qualifiers) and implement a reasonable system of internal accounting
controls. After commenting on how extensive the Act's potential impact is "because of its
generality and apparently formless wording,"8 Clark goes on to suggest a fairly
conservative reading, tied to the accounting profession's historic understanding of the
task of internal controls in the reporting process. An interesting footnote, however,
acknowledges that there are many hard questions to be answered, including the extent to
which controls relating to reporting blur into controls over general legal compliance or
operational decision-making. 9
A few preliminary comments are in order. First, the subsection is a reminder of
some important regulatory history. Concern about the adequacy of internal controls-and
corporate accountability generally-was one of the most important issues in securities
regulation in the 1970s. Because a handful of large corporations had funded the break-in
of the Democratic headquarters, the Watergate scandal led directly to questions about the
legitimacy of corporate managers' opaque dominion over corporate assets, especially as it
related to foreign and domestic bribery and ilIegal political campaign contributions. An
aggressive SEC enforcement program focusing on "management integrity" ensued, 10 and

5. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
6. CLARK, supra note 4, at 132-33.
7. Id. at 133.
8. Id. at 134.
9. Id. at 135 n.30.
10. See SEC REpORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Ralph
Ferrara et aI., Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U. L. REv.
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with more and more misbehavior publicized, Congress responded with the FCP A. In
1979, the SEC proposed (but later withdrew) a requirement that management evaluate
and report on its internal controls on Form lO-K, II which is the heart of what SarbanesOxley now demands. These events were surrounded by controversy and criticism much
like today. 12
Second, the question of definition and scope is indeed crucial, and the "formless"
quality of section 13(b)(2) admits a number of possibilities. Clark suggests that
shareholders are unambiguously the beneficiaries of internal accounting controls
legislation, and that the Act should be construed with their needs in mind. They bear the
costs, too, so that reasonableness is a key limitation. Above all, the scope of the Act
should not tum into something that interferes with legitimate business judgments by
company managers, whether as to operational decisions or legal compliance generally
(i.e., beyond financial reporting).
This latter point will be my main interest when we return shortly to SarbanesOxley and section 404. Clark has the right intuition about the interests at stake with
respect to internal accounting and disclosure controls, but I think he underestimates the
difficulty of identifying the optimal scope and depth of such controls. In fact, this inquiry
touches on a disputed question in securities law-for whose benefit, exactly, do financial
reporting requirements exist? But before we take up the question, we should move the
story forward fifteen years from the time Corporate Law was written to the onset of the
Sarbanes-Oxley era.
III. THE INTERNAL CONTROLS STORY FROM 1986 TO 2001
If a second edition of Corporate Law had appeared in the late 1990s, it would
surely have reported on two subsequent legal developments, and perhaps a third. The first
two conform reasonably well to Clark's analysis. The federal Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines were developed to make clear that corporations with a reasonable compliance
system would get some credit at the sentencing phase even though they were found by
imputation to have violated federal law, making some affirmative compliance system a de
facto requirement for companies with reason to fear criminal prosecution. This
immediately set in motion discussions about the scope, depth, and content of an
appropriate compliance regime. 13 To many, the Guidelines were not applied with much
rigor, so that the credit that would come from a system was largely a "check the box" or
cosmetic matter. 14 It did, however, help create a compliance industry that assisted

555,581-83 (1981).
II. Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, 44
1979) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 229, 240, 249).
12. For a contemporaneous critical review of the statute, see ABA

Fed. Reg.

26702

(proposed May

4,

Committee on Corporate Laws and
Accounting, A Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,34 Bus. LAW. 307 (1978).
13. E.g., Dan Webb & Steven Molo, Some Practical Considerations in Developing Effective Compliance
Programs: A Frameworkfor Meeting the Requirements of the Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 375

(1993).
14. See Kim Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 487, 512-14 (2003); William Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting and the Paradox of Compliance, 52
VAND. L. REv. 1343, 1407-10(1999).
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companies in checking the right boxes, thus moving the arts and sciences of compliance
management at least marginally forward.
The second major development was the Caremark case,15 Chancellor Allen's
thoughtful discussion of the continued vitality of Graham under Delaware law. Times
have changed, he said (noting the Guidelines in particular), so that it was no longer
reasonable for directors to act as if compliance monitoring is something reserved for
responding to danger signs that happen to appear. The board therefore has some
affirmative obligation of compliance monitoring. Caremark has been the subject of
extensive commentary, which need not be repeated here. Many have noted the acoustic
separation in the opinion-rhetorically, it is a strong wake-up call to directors, but with
very little liability threat behind it. 16 Only "sustained and systematic indifference" to
compliance by the board would breach the duty (and by this time, section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware Code was in place so that there would still be no duty of care liability threat for
directors in the majority of companies with exculpation clauses in their charters, at least
in the absence of bad faith).17 I suspect that a second edition of Corporate Law would
have mildly applauded Caremark as a matter of law because it follows Clark's critique of
Graham quite closely; even though it makes legal compliance a corporate law issue, its
liability threat is restrained enough to leave ample room for business judgment on the
specifics of compliance design.
The third development is somewhat more subtle, and brings us back to financial
reporting and internal controls under federal law. After noting the anxiety over the
breadth of section 13(b)(2), Clark observes that as of the mid-1980s, "the SEC has done
little to substantiate those fears." 18 That is an understatement. In fact, in the face of
threatened political backlash from the business community made more salient by the
election of President Reagan and a Republican Senate in 1980, the SEC made an unusual
formal statement in 1981 pledging to read the law narrowly, from which it never
deviated. 19 From then on, the accounting controls provisions were essentially only raised
in enforcement actions when there was evidence of actual misreporting by the issuer, so
that any controls failure claim was largely surplusage.
But there is a back story. In the face of continuing examples of financial
misreporting, especially among banking institutions, the SEC continued to express
concern about financial misreporting and made further changes to upgrade the quality of
disclosure in lO-Ks and lO-Qs. In the mid-1980's, a private sector initiative led to the
creation of the so-called Treadway Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting,
15. In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
16. See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director's Compliance Oversight Responsibility in the PostCaremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. I, 24-29 (200 I); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal
Controls, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 261-64 (1997); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1619, 1672-76 (2001).

17. More recently, the bad faith doctrine has developed so as to make exculpation clauses arguably less
potent. See McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001), modified, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying
Delaware law); Hillary Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 482-84 (2004). But see In re
Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452,2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19,2005) (narrowing the
scope of good faith duty).
18. CLARK, supra note 4, at 134.
19. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Exchange Act Release No. 17500 (Jan. 29, 1981), 1981 WL
36385.
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chaired by a newly departed SEC Commissioner, which made a series of
recommendations to address problems in the internal controls environment. In 1988 the
SEC again formally proposed requiring management to evaluate and report on its internal
controls,20 though once again the proposal was never implemented. Instead, the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)
committed to develop a private sector framework that would give more substance to what
good internal controls should be. Its report, Internal Controls: An Integrated Framework,
was released in 1992,21 and now plays a significant role under Sarbanes-Oxley. The
sponsoring organizations were the major institutions in the accounting industry, including
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
By the mid-1990s, the devolution of financial reporting quality, which had been
worrisome for at least two decades, seemed to accelerate. The reasons for this
deterioration are multi-faceted and have also been extensively discussed elsewhere. 22
They include (at least) the sustained bull market, which made investors pay less attention
to issuer credibility; judicial and legislative developments making private securities
litigation harder to bring; a reduction in SEC fiscal and political resources; conflicts of
interest in the accounting profession and elsewhere; and financial innovation,
technological innovation, and the explosive growth of options-based executive
compensation, each of which provided further motive and opportunity for financial
misreporting. Out of this came Enron, Worldcorn, and Sarbanes-Oxley.
IV. SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNAL CONTROLS
Although section 404 is the focus of most attention, there are actually two
provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley that impose internal controls obligations. The other, section
302, is actually the more elaborate, requiring CEO and CFO certification of the issuer's
10-Ks and 1O_Qs.23 Section 302 says that, in addition to certifying the accuracy of the
disclosures, the officers must also affirm that they are responsible for internal controls;
have designed such controls to ensure that material information is brought to their
attention; have evaluated its effectiveness in the last 90 days; have presented in their
report their conclusions about its effectiveness; and have discussed in the report any
changes in internal controls during the period under review, including corrective actions.
By contrast, section 404 simply insists that each lO-K contain management's assessment
of internal controls, and--crucially-requires the independent auditor to attest to and

20. Report of Management's Responsibilities, Securities Act Release No. 6789, Exchange Act Release
No. 25925, Investment Company Release Act No. 16485,53 Fed. Reg. 28009-01 (proposed July 26,1988).
21. See ABA Committee on Law & Accounting, Management Reports on Internal Controls: A Legal
Perspective, 49 Bus. LAW. 889 (1994); Mark R. Simons, COSO Based Auditing, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec.
1997, at 68.
22. E.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL
MARKETS (2003); John C. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301 (2004); Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate Financial
Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2004).
23. See Lisa Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal
Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 1,56-58 (2002). Section 302 is one of two
certification provisions; the other is section 906, a criminal provision, which does not refer to internal controls.
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report on that assessment.
The SEC's initial implementation of the rules was quick, even though there were
inconsistencies in the statutory formulation to address. Section 302 speaks of "internal
controls," whereas section 404 refers to "internal controls over financial reporting."
Recognizing that there was a subtle but substantive distinction here, the Commission
stated in new Rule 13a-15 that issuers had to design and implement two separate but
overlapping control systems. The first-"disclosure controls and procedures"-is
designed to elicit information from throughout the organization for management to make
timely and accurate decisions as to required disclosure of any sort under the securities
laws. Reporting on these disclosure controls and procedures is mandated in Item 307 of
Regulation S-K. The second-"internal controls over financial reporting"--deals with
assuring that financial reports are prepared in accord with generally accepted accounting
principles. It is reported pursuant to Item 308 of Regulation S-K. Perhaps
unfortunately,24 nearly all of the business community's attention has focused on the
latter, because it is the one that must be audited pursuant to section 404 (and Item 2-02 of
Regulation S-X) and because Item 308's reporting instructions are more elaborate,
including the explicit duty to disclose material weaknesses and the warning that
management cannot conclude that its controls are effective if there are one or more
unremedied material weaknesses.
Evaluating internal controls of either kind requires that a benchmark be available
against which to compare the effectiveness of any given system. As to internal disclosure
controls, there is no guidance in the text of the rules. For internal controls over financial
reporting, Rule 13a-15(c) requires an evaluation based on a "suitable, recognized control
framework established by a body or group that has followed due-process procedures,
including the broad distribution of the framework for public comment."25 According to
the SEC, the only body that clearly meets that test is COSO, whose "Integrated
Framework" has thus become the de facto standard.
Completing the relevant set of rules is Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS-2) of the
PCAOB,26 which was created by Sarbanes-Oxley to regulate the public company audit
process and has the specific statutory authority to set audit standards. 27 AS-2 defines
auditor obligations with respect to the review and evaluation of management's internal
controls over financial reporting (not the broader "disclosure controls and procedures").
As a result, it also sets de facto standards with respect to management's own evaluation,

24. There is some reason to suspect that the most useful information for disclosure purposes is not the
financial reports but risk disclosure, such as that which should be disclosed in the MD&A, and conflict of
interest transactions. Although some contingencies and conflicts are reflected in the financials, that kind of
disclosure is normally found elsewhere-hence outside "internal controls over financial reporting" but in
"disclosure controls and procedures."
25. Rule 13a-15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.l3a-15(c) (2005).
26. PCAOB,
Auditing
Standard
No.
2,
available
at
http://www.pcaob.orglRulesfRules_oCthe_BoardiAuditin~Standard_2.pdf
(hereinafter AS-2). For a
discussion, see Linda Griggs, Audits of Internal Controls over Financial Reporting: What Do They Mean?,
INSIGHTS, Apr. 2004, at 2; see also sources cited supra note 3.
27. See generally James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the
Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (2003). For a legal criticism of the process of
PCAOB standard-setting, see Donna Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and its
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005).

HeinOnline -- 31 J. Corp. L. 955 2005-2006

956

The Journal o/Corporation Law

[Spring

because management's failure to adhere will result in a qualified or otherwise adverse
auditor opinion. And because the SEC's internal controls rules do not address either the
breadth or depth of the required controls system in any great detail, AS-2 is now the most
authoritative guidance on the subject. It should be read closely by anyone interested in
corporate or securities law.
AS-2 is expansive with respect to both the breadth and depth of the internal
controls audit. As to breadth, the audit process reaches every input that goes into the
process of financial reporting, as well as the mechanisms for translating those inputs into
the financial reports. That, of course, includes all base-level data generated by daily
business operations, but also extends well into the corporate governance process.
Paragraph 24 emphasizes that the scope extends to controls over potential
misappropriation of assets, the company's risk assessment policies, its code of ethics and
conduct, the extent of internal monitoring, and its procedures for whistle-blowing. And in
a directive probably not yet fully appreciated by corporate scholars, paragraphs 55
through 59 require the auditor to evaluate the effectiveness of the audit committee of the
issuer's board of directors as part of the control environment, including whether "the
right questions are raised and pursued with management and the auditor." Paragraph 59
says that ineffective oversight by the audit committee is at least a significant internal
controls deficiency and a strong indicator of a material weakness, which in tum would
require disclosure of the audit committee weakness if not corrected.
That internal controls (and the audit thereof) must operate broadly has long been
understood. The much more difficult question is how deep they must go. This is the
familiar problem raised by Clark: how much independent evaluation of the quality and
integrity of the inputs and their processing must occur? Put bluntly, how much trust in
normal information flow is permissible, or when must there instead be extensive
detective work-"corporate espionage," to borrow the phrase from Graham-to uncover
negligence or deliberate noncompliance? Before Sarbanes-Oxley, it was commonly
understood that an audit's assessment of internal controls was not a fraud prevention
device as such, but rather simply a way of gaining confidence in the company's numbers.
The limited depth of the standard assessment of the control environment reflected this.
The question now is to what extent Sarbanes-Oxley requires a deeper dig. The costs
associated with internal controls come largely in the answer to this question.
AS-2 starts off with the standard assertion: internal controls must provide
"reasonable assurances," not absolute certainty. Hence, there is a judgmental element.
Perhaps the key sentence in the entire standard, however, then comes in paragraph 9: a
significant deficiency in controls arises when there are one or more flaws in the control
system such that "there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the
company's annual or interim financial statements that is more than inconsequential."28
Something is considered remote only when the chance of its occurrence is "slight"-a
more than remote risk, then, is anything more than a slight one. According to paragraph
10, a material weakness is one or more significant deficiencies that create a "more than

28. AS-2, supra note 26 para. 9 (emphasis added). Paragraph 9 then says that something is
"inconsequential" if a reasonable person would conclude, under the circumstances, that it "would clearly be
immaterial to the financial statements. If a reasonable person could not reach such a conclusion ... that
misstatement is more than inconsequential." ld. (emphasis added).
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remote" likelihood that a material misstatement in the financials will not be prevented or
detected. 29 In sum, some combination of what AS-2 calls "preventive controls" and
"detective controls" must reasonably address any such "more than remote" risk. That,
obviously, demands substantial depth because there are countless risks relating to the
financial reporting controls environment that could meet the more-than-remote test, and
thus require some level of attention.
V. INTERPRETING "REASONABLE ASSURANCES"

In light of the foregoing, it should not be surprising that there has been substantial
uncertainty as to what the new internal controls rules require. The puzzling questions go
to both scope and depth. As to scope, for example, does an internal controls system have
to incorporate a compliance system with respect to federal and state laws affecting how
the company does business (the problem posed in Graham and Caremark)? Both the SEC
and PCAOB have said not as such, but then take much of that back by acknowledging
that noncompliance with federal or state law may create contingent liabilities or risks that
may, under the circumstances, have to be accrued in the financials, described in a
footnote to the financials, or disclosed elsewhere, such as in the MD&A portion of the
IO-K or IO_Q.30 If there is a more than remote risk relating to the financials, then there is
a possible connection to be considered. And even if not with respect to the financials,
management must still worry about the separate (albeit unaudited) "disclosure controls
and procedures" certification and reporting obligations, which presumably require a
system for gathering forward-looking information relating to risks the company faces. In
other words, a failure to have a compliance system to detect violations of law could,
under the right circumstances, be an internal controls failure.
But again, depth is the bigger issue. How much inquiry, double-checking, and
surveillance is necessary to come to a reasonable assurance as to the control environment
in light of the "more than remote" risk standard? The remainder of this Article will
largely be commentary on that question. As noted above, everyone seems to agree that
this involves judgment, not mechanics, and presumably the judgment is of the
conventional sort: the level of depth should not generate more cost than benefits, and
there should be no less costly way of gaining those benefits. It would be trite simply to
say that costs and benefits are hard to quantify, and may often use incommensurable
measures. That is true, but already well understood as a generality. My points are more
specific to the internal controls context.
A. Managerial Incentives

The starting point is to consider management's own incentives. Keep in mind that
29. Obviously, the materiality standard here provides some protection from the need to dwell on small
matters. However, the materiality standard employed contains both quantitative and qualitative elements, which
make it difficult to ignore small matters simply because they are small. See SEC Staff Accounting. Bulletin No.
99,64 Fed. Reg. 45150-01 (Aug. 19, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pI. 211); JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 580-82 (5th ed. 2006).
30. SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2005); see COX ET AL., supra note 29, at 571-75. On the
accounting issues, see Matthew J. Barrett, Opportunities for Obtaining and Using Litigation Reserves and
Disclosures, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017 (2002).
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there are two separate but related objectives built into the internal controls requirement.
One is to bring material information to management's attention, the other to permit
monitors like auditors or board audit committees to verify the quality of the information
flow and processing by management.
Why would managers ever choose a system of less-than-perfect information from
below?31 The easy answer, of course, is that internal controls and verification procedures
are very costly, a subject to which we tum shortly. But if costs are the only issue, then we
might want to trust management's judgment on the right balance.
Principal-agent problems are another obvious possibility. Senior managers might
choose to under-invest in monitoring the activities of subordinates for a variety of selfish
reasons. Not knowing might create legal or reputational protection that comes with
"plausible deniability,"32 or be a trade with subordinates: granting them some degree of
autonomy (and thus the ability to conceal their own self-serving behavior) in return for
their political support or their assistance in helping the higher-ups keep hidden what they
wish. We should not push this too hard, however; plainly, knowledge is power for senior
managers33 and too much ignorance of what happens below is dangerous.
The agency cost issue becomes much clearer when we see internal controls not
simply as a way of moving information upwards but simultaneously permitting its
external verification. Managers no doubt want some opacity within their own sphere of
activities to conceal risky or opportunistic behavior, so strong internal controls are a
threat. Muddying their own informational environments (e.g., relying on informal
information networks rather than formal ones 34 ) may be the price for gaining the desired
autonomy. Here, the incentives to conceal are much the same as the incentives to
mislead, a subject that has received ample attention from both lawyers and economists. 35
A third category falls somewhere in between. A familiar concern is that
informational and control needs vary over the life cycle of the firm-the management
structure that works in making a start-up successful or a small company grow may be
deficient as applied to a large and successful enterprise. There is a cognitive problem here
because such change is hard to see from within, so that the original structure stays in
place too long without modification simply because the managers are paying attention to
31. This is not the same question as why managers do not voluntarily disclose information; management
presumably would want to know more than it might choose to disclose.
32. See generally Larry D. Browning & Robert Folger, Communication Under Conditions of Litigation
Risk: A Grounded Theory of Plausible Deniability and the Iran-Contra Affair, in THE LEGALISTIC
ORGANIZATION 251 (Sim Sitkin & Robert Bies eds., 1994) (discussing the accountability of conduct when
actions are taken deliberately because of the risk of litigation); John C. Coffee, Beyond the Shut Eyed Sentry:
Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099
(1977) (discussing models for reforming the common law of corporate misconduct).
33. For a recent case noting the depth of senior management's access to information, see Nursing Home
Pension Fund Local 144 v. Oracle Corp., 380 F.3d 1226, 1230-32 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act was designed to eliminate frivolous sham actions and not actions of
substance). On senior management's ability to exploit lack of communication below, see Lawrence Mitchell,
Structural Holes, CEO's and Information Monopolies-the Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOK.
L. REv. 1313 (2005).
34. See infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
35. E.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Oren Bar-Gil, Misreporting Corporate Performance (Harv. Law & Econ.
Discussion Paper No. 4000, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrvn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=354141;
see also sources cited supra note 3.

HeinOnline -- 31 J. Corp. L. 958 2005-2006

2006]

Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley

959

more pressing matters. 36 Once this happens, correctives become much more expensive,
and then resisted for both economic and cognitive reasons.
The latter two explanations, at least, suggest that Clark is right in his intuition that
internal accounting controls ought not be left completely to managerial business
judgment. A faithful board of directors would thus be expected to insist on something
more, and the law might need to compensate if we fear that the board on its own might
not do enough. Hence, we tum from whether the law should prompt the implementation
of a workable controls system to how the law should seek the right balance between costs
and benefits.

B. Costs
Measuring the costs of internal monitoring is something I have written about in
some detail elsewhere,37 and I do not want to repeat myself. Some of the out-of-pocket
costs associated with an internal controls system are easily identified in terms of audit
fees, manpower, or hours spent by line, compliance, and audit personnel. Harder to
quantify are the opportunity costs and the distractions. AS-2 makes clear that controls and
their audit will often be intrusive-for example, an observation of mail opening and cash
processing that may lead to inquiries and explanations from relevant personnel and the
assurance that good documentation is being created. 38 Paragraph 96 gives an illustration
of overseeing how sales managers review and investigate unusual invoices, which may
require not only having the manager explain, but also then corroborate those
explanations, which may generate the need for further explanation and recordkeeping.
The more abstract cost question is one that particularly interests Clark in
Corporate Law. He responds to Graham-like arguments against a duty to monitor that
relate to the effect on employee motivation and morale by admitting that it
may cause discomfort to employees who do not like to be watched. But it is a
discomfort that may necessarily attend all efforts at supervision and control and
the cost seems warranted in light of widespread reports of corporate illegality.
Moreover, no rational employee should feel personally insulted by an impartial
system of internal controls applicable to all the corporation's employees. 39
Perhaps so as a normative matter, but the social science research treats this conclusion as

36. See Johnny Jermias, Cognitive Dissonance and Resistance to Change: The Influence of Commitment
Confirmation and Feedback on Judgment Usefulness ofAccounting Systems, 26 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC'y 141, 145

(2001). More generally, there is the fear that managers are cognitively more attentive to short-run costs and
benefits than long-run ones, and may make insufficient investments in projects without an immediate enough
pay-off, which might include control systems. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen, The Short-Term, Long-Term
Dichotomy and Investment Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70
L. REv. 137 (1991) (examining the current state of American financial markets); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk,
Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REv. 277 (1990) (suggesting a new

N.C.

fiduciary standard for corporate investment decisions).
37. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with
Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. 1. REv. 71,93-100 (examining social and cognitive psychology conclusions regarding
legal compliance and employee monitoring).
38. AS-2, supra note 26 para. 93.
39. CLARK, supra note 4, at 131-32.
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at least debatable in tenns of its impact on internal efficiency and productivity.40 Close
monitoring can have perverse effects on the sense of trust (and, implicitly, the
psychological contract),41 perhaps crowding out loyalty and commitment. It may also
affect aggressiveness and risk-taking. The fact that many organizations deliberately give
key employees or teams a wide degree of autonomy (subject only to ex post perfonnance
measures), even when stricter monitoring is technologically feasible, suggests that there
is likely some inchoate motivational cost to introducing a high-powered control system;
my sense is that it may be a serious one. We shall return to a specific example later.
C. Benefits

We can now agree with Clark on two points: internal accounting and disclosure
controls cannot be left to management's business judgment, and they are costly. The law
is right to intervene and require that the board and management invest in controls so long
as the benefits justify the costs. That brings us to the hardest question in this exercise:
assessing the benefits, so that we have a way of knowing when the costs have become
excessive. Here again, Clark sees the issue, raising a question as to whether shareholders
necessarily benefit from strict compliance systems generally, but then suggesting that
they are clear beneficiaries of the kind of internal accounting controls required by the
FCPA, at least if the Act is reasonably interpreted. My sense is that there is much more to
think about. Without doubting that hard questions come in quantifying the benefits (if
any) of a given system or control mechanism, the more basic problem comes in
identifying what kinds of benefits-indeed, benefits to whom?-we are searching for in
the first place. The more benefits and beneficiaries we find, the greater the costs that
might seem justified and thus required by the rules.
1. From Shareholders to Investors
The dominant corporate law claim is that the issuer's current shareholders are its
principal (perhaps only real) beneficiaries, and Clark seems to assume this contention in
his analysis of the duty of monitoring. 42 With respect to securities regulation, however,
the analysis is much more complicated. As many have pointed out, existing shareholders
will often suffer rather than benefit from truth-telling and hence prefer less-than-fuII
transparency ex post. 43 To be sure, opacity has its costs as weII, assuming that the market
40. Compare George A. Akerlof & Rachel G. Kranton, Identity and the Economics a/Organizations, 19 J.
ECON. PERSP. 9, 22-28 (2005) (discussing the adverse effects of strict monitoring on identity), and Robert
Cialdini, Social Influence and the Triple Tumor Structure 0/ Organizational Dishonesty, in CODES OF
CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH ON BUSINESS ETHICS (David Messick & Ann Tenbrunsel eds., 1996), with
Angela L. Coletti et aI., The Effect 0/ Control Systems on Trust and Cooperation in Collaborative
Environments, 80 ACCT. REV. 477 (2005) (finding more positive effects to oversight), and Jennifer S. Lerner &
Philip G. Tetlock, Accounting/or the Effects a/Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255,259 (1999) (same),
and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne, How to Restore Higher Powered Incentives in Multitask Agencies, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 418 (1999) (discussing the positive effects of monitoring).
41. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust. Trustworthiness. and the Behavioral Foundations 0/
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001) (discussing the effects of monitoring as applied high up in the
organization).
42. Elsewhere, Clark does explore other formulations. See CLARK, supra note 4 § 16.2.
43. See Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REv.
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penalizes opacity efficiently, so there are incentives favoring a commitment to
transparency ex ante. This result creates a significant trade-off for current shareholders,
so that there will not necessarily be unqualified support for high investments in internal
controls that might expose bad news that would lead to a reduction in the value of their
shares. 44 In part, it will be a question of the liquidity needs of shareholders and how
frequently the corporation taps the capital markets. Research in financial economics
suggests that there are clientele effects-long-term shareholders demand less extensive
transparency and disclosure, while those who trade more frequently (especially actively
managed institutional investors) want more transparency-and corporate behavior in fact
tracks these preferences based on which category dominates. 45
The same point arises from the conflict between debt and equity. It may be in
shareholders' interest to leverage the company fairly aggressively, assuming favorable
interest rates. Because debt holders must largely protect themselves, indentures and loan
agreements build in prophylactics, allowing for protective action or adjusting terms when
there is a change in financial condition. Typically, these protections use GAAPdenominated accounting measures as triggers, or perhaps rely on the rating agencies,
which in tum rely heavily on the accounting. Under these circumstances, equity-holders
may at any given moment prefer something other than faithful adherence to GAAP and
would consider burdensome any internal financial controls system that made it more
likely that debt holders would renegotiate or cut off the supply of cheap funds. In fact, a
careful look at many episodes of financial misreporting (including Enron) suggests that
they were heavily motivated by the desire to preserve access to the debt markets by not
triggering protective covenants or rating downgrades. 46 As with other kinds of
noncompliance, equity holders would benefit were the scheme to succeed. So here again
the benefits to shareholders of internal controls that produce more accurate financial
reporting are mixed.
From an orthodox corporate law perspective, therefore, one could say the right
balance between opacity and transparency varies over time and among issuers, which
would suggest that too strict a system of required internal controls is often inefficient.
Securities law, however, does not treat the issuer's existing shareholders as the primary
beneficiaries of investment in high quality disclosure;47 it is as much, and probably more,

945 (1991) (discussing whether corporations should be allowed to lie to the market and how different ideas of
stock market efficiency underlie the regulation of corporate speech and other aspects of corporate law). On the
costs to the company and its shareholders from internal compliance systems that have the effect of making
potentially profitable violations of law more detectable, see Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling
Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis o/Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.V. L. REV. 687 (1997).
44. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side 0/ Shareholder Value, 76 TuL. L. REV. 1275 (2002)
(addressing the implications of the Enron collapse on the self-regulatory system of corporate governance).
45. See. e.g., Brian J. Bushee & Christopher F. Noe, Corporate Disclosure Practices. Institutional
Investors and Stock Return Volatility, 38 J. ACCT. RES. 171 (Supp. 2000) (discussing the effect of a firm's
disclosure practices on stock return volatility).
46. Langevoort, supra note 22, at 5; e.g., Thomas Fields et aI., Empirical Research on Accounting Choice,
31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 255, 271-75 sec. 4.2.2 (2001).
47. Even the SEC has sometimes been careless on this point, stating in its 1979 release, for example, that
"it is not in the interest of shareholders for the cost of internal accounting control to exceed the benefits."
Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, 44 Fed. Reg. 26702, 26704 (proposed May 4, 1979)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211,229, 240,299) (emphasis added).
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concerned with outside investors who are deciding whether to buy company securities. 48
To this group, the benefits of transparency are clearer, although ex ante even future
shareholders might opt for a regime of less-than-full candor if, on average, corporate
profitability is enhanced by the ability to keep some kinds of secrets. 49
My point here is simply that measuring the benefits to investors from investments in
internal controls depends on which investors one is considering, and what is good for one
group (e.g., debt or outside investors) may not be for another. Securities regulation adopts
a strong bias in favor of transparency-seeking share price integrity-notwithstanding
this divergence. As a result, contrary to what Clark suggests in his comments on the
FCPA, the traditional corporate law standard of existing shareholder interests is probably
not the right baseline for assessing the benefits of internal controls. Internal accounting
control requirements are designed to produce positive externalities for non-shareholder
investors, something that necessarily alters the appropriate cost-benefit mix. Perhaps the
most important message here is to point out something of a philosophical inconsistency
in the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms. Many of the reforms assume that corporate governance
strategies, such as having more independent directors (or independent director control
over the audit committee), naturally lead to more candid disclosure. But if independent
directors are responsive mainly to the current generation of shareholders in contrast to
debt holders or outside investors, then that will not necessarily be the case. 50 In terms of
internal controls, the beneficiaries of a strong system will include (and may be dominated
by) outside investor interests, to whom neither the directors nor management have any
loyalty. Sarbanes-Oxley seeks to conscript directors into a more public-regarding role
than a regime based on shareholder wealth maximization would produce on its own.
Finally, there is a very different kind of problem in measuring the benefits to
investors from strong internal controls. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley rules contemplate
both disclosure and accounting controls, disproportionate attention-generated largely by
the audit requirement in section 404-has been devoted to the latter. Even if we assume
that the purpose behind securities regulation is the promotion of market price integrity,
we should ask about the relationship between accounting disclosure and securities
prices. 51 One of the subtly troubling aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley is the extent to which it
devotes extraordinary attention and resources to enhancing GAAP compliance when
many economists and others wonder just how significant accounting statements are in the
rational formation of stock prices, as opposed to other kinds of information and
disclosure. 52 In fundamental value terms, one year's (or one quarter's) earnings have
48. See generally Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41
DUKE L.J. 977 (1992). For an exploration of the resulting tension, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal
Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1044 (2005).
49. In fact, the securities laws regularly make trade-offs between candor and "benign" secrecy. See
Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 763 (1995).
50. See generally Bratton, supra note 44.
51. See CLARK. supra note 4, at 752-53.
52. See Baruch Lev, Corporate Earnings: Facts or Fiction, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 32 (2003) (observing
that "the extent to which GAAP fulfills its mission-the dissemination of quality financial information, and
earnings in particular, to facilitate investors' valuations and the monitoring of management-has frequently been
challenged, but never more hotly in the last couple of years"); see also Langevoort, supra note 22, at 24-28;
Stephen Penman, The Quality of Financial Statements: Perspectives from the Recent Stock Market Bubble, 17
ACCT. HORIZONS 77 (Supp. 2003). For an interesting perspective see Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of
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limited predictive value. Pursuing this inquiry thoroughly would take us too far afield,
but obviously share value relates to the future, not the past, and accounting metrics miss
much of what is of value even in assessing the current financial condition of the
company. 53 To the extent that internal financial reporting controls are purportedly
justified in terms of share price accuracy, the question is how much value is added by
marginal increases in the quality of balance sheets, income statements, and statements of
cash flow. Some, to be sure, but it is hard to say much more than that, yet determining the
optimal level of investment in internal accounting controls depends on a more precise
answer.
2. Alternative Visions: Efficient Markets and Agency Costs
The foregoing "share price integrity" account is the conventional story. But some
securities law theorists dissent from the view that the benefits of disclosure mechanisms
accrue to investors in terms of better pricing. Most of these rely fairly heavily on strong
claims of market efficiency. We have already noted the possibility that market efficiency
diminishes (or in particularly strong versions, eliminates) the tension between short- and
long-term investor interests, at least ex ante. If we take efficiency seriously enough, it can
also lead to different conclusions about the benefits, or lack thereof, of disclosure
requirements. 54
As Clark himself points out in a different chapter of Corporate Law, market
efficiency has profound implications for disclosure policy, though neither he nor many
serious contemporary scholars conclude that there is no role at all for mandatory
disclosure. 55 There is a plausible argument that whatever the scope of mandatory
disclosure, the market will price the residual risk of fraud or inaccurate disclosure fairly
well. If so, diversified investors should be indifferent to whether there is high quality
disclosure or not. This has led scholars like Merritt Fox to argue that the real benefits
from disclosure are not so much to investors but to the process of capital allocation
among firms-honest firms have a more credible claim to economic resources when there
is full disclosure, which thus generates positive externalities for the economy as a
whole. 56 My point here is not to agree or disagree but simply to observe that allocative

Short-Term Performance Obsession, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May/June 2005, at 65.
53. E.g., MARGARET BLAIR & STEVEN WALLMAN, UNSEEN WEALTH: REpORT OF THE BROOKINGS TASK
FORCE ON INTANGIBLES 23-31 (200 I).
54. Obviously, the debate over efficiency is too heated to delve into here. That securities prices may
deviate, perhaps considerably, from fundamental value is today more widely accepted even among financial
economists than it was when Clark wrote Corporate Law. See, e.g., Symposium, Revisiting the Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 499 (2003) (articles discussing recent developments in financial economics).
For a vigorous expression of the consequences in terms of shareholder and investor protection, see Michael
Jensen, The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 10 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 549 (2004). Obviously, even relaxing
assumptions about efficiency does not by itself justify heavier regulation if one doubts how well regulators will
do their jobs.
55. CLARK, supra note 4, at 756-60 (drawing heavily from Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection ofinvestors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984)).
56. See generally Merritt Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate
Whom?, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2498 (1997). But see Lynn Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An
Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988)
(questioning allocative efficiency as a central goal of securities regulation).
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efficiency might present an additional or different set of benefits against which to assess
the costs of an internal controls system.
A more deregulatory view, which Paul Mahoney has advocated,57 agrees that the
market can protect the properly diversified investor from the risk of inaccurate pricing as
such. What still needs to be controlled, however, are agency costs, because insider abuses
misappropriate resources and operate as a dead-weight social loss. While agency law is
largely the domain of state corporate law, the securities laws-properly read in historical
context----{;an be seen as an effective supplement. This fact has important implications for
the design of the disclosure regime, which should not strive for breadth and
completeness, because those costs are unnecessary, but simply target those situations
where transparency specifically helps overcome principal-agent problems. Here,
presumably, the benefits of an internal controls system would be measured by (and
largely limited to) how well it helps monitor and control the behavior of the firm's senior
managers. This kind of system would be far narrower than what is contemplated by
something like AS-2, though the PCAOB's standard plainly has an agency cost element
embedded in it. This vision is the one that comes closest to justifying internal controls in
terms of the interests of the issuer's current shareholders, because they unambiguously do
benefit from efficient controls on agency costs.
3. Stakeholders and Social Licenses
So far, we have assumed that the intended beneficiaries of disclosure and internal
controls are investors and/or the economy. And that, surely, is the received wisdom. But
there may be more to it than that, and hence different kinds of benefits that might justify
additional investment in internal controls and be included in the benchmarking.
The question of whether securities regulation was designed for the benefit of noninvestor constituencies as well as investors is an interesting one, as Cindy Williams has
shown. 58 Regardless of one's impression of the history, non-investor interests today play
a significant political role in the formulation of securities law policy and thus might also
count as beneficiaries of the internal controls rules. If so, then those benefits may need to
be added to the calculus. 59
AS-2 is fairly clear that there is something to this theory. Paragraph 6 says, for
example, that government regulators are specific beneficiaries of required internal
controls, and in Appendix E the PCAOB observes that accurate financials are important
to a broad range of groups: "the board of directors, management, employees, investors,

57. Paul Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047
(1995).
58. See Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Responsibility,
112 HARV. L. REv. 1179 (1999).
59. As to identifying other public interests, we know that organized labor and public pension funds take an
interest in securities regulation policy designed to enhance managerial accountability and better corporate social
responsibility, and probably not simply because of concern about workers' savings and retirement benefits. That
which decentralizes managerial power and creates more transparency and accountability can potentially make it
more subject to external stakeholder influence. In light of the well-documented impact of the financial scandals
on company employees, we cannot rule at least this effect out of bounds in terms of Sarbanes-Oxley's statutory
purpose, and hence the scope of its intended benefits.

HeinOnline -- 31 J. Corp. L. 964 2005-2006

2006]

Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley

965

lenders, customers and regulators."60 That breadth of beneficiaries, it notes, is
underscored by its statutory mandate, which is "to protect the interests of investors and
further the public interest."61
There is also something more diffuse but maybe just as influential. Social norms
seemingly have shifted in the last thirty-five years in the direction of expecting greater
transparency and accountability from institutions that have significant political,
economic, or social power, whether public or private. 62 Institutions (and their leaders)
that inappropriately conceal or dissemble are punished more harshly in the news media
and in markets of various sorts,63 as well as in the courts. This idea of "social license"
has interesting behavioral effects, both inside and outside the organization. 64 In the
aftermath of Enron and Worldcom, I suspect, there was a palpable public demand to
respond to overreaching by economic elites by building more public accountability into
large corporations. In this sense, Sarbanes-Oxley was not simply investor protection but a
backlash against the exercise of power in a way that violated emerging social
expectations about the governance of institutions that strongly affect peoples' lives and
wealth. One indication that this contention is more than an academic abstraction is the
common impression that Sarbanes-Oxley also sets legal standards for private companies,
not-for-profits, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and government agencies. 65 It
does not, at least not by its terms. But to the extent that it is a reflection of broader social
expectations about institutional governance, leaders of those kinds of institutions would
have reason to pay attention. If so, then the benefits of internal controls even in public
companies might not be measured simply by reference to standard investor metrics.
VI. EFFECTS

To be clear about the foregoing, I am not making any normative claim that
section 404 or other internal control requirements growing out of Sarbanes-Oxley should
be interpreted in accord with anyone of these possibilities about who is supposed to
benefit and in what ways. Rather, my point is simply that a "reasonable assurance"
judgment predicated on assessing likely costs and benefits is fruitless unless one defines
fairly clearly what benefits are to be considered, and in light of the foregoing discussion,
the possible benefits are so expansive as to justify (and thus require) almost limitless
60. AS-2 supra note 26 para. E5. Appendix E consists of explanations for the policy choices made in AS2.

61. Id. para. E6.
62. This, of course, is a major theme in recent work on the blurring of the public-private boundaries. E.g.,
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.V. L. REV. 543 (2000) (describing increased
reliance on private action in regulatory behavior).
63. For a discussion of the economics behind social pressures on firms to conform to evolving
expectations, see Jason Scott Johnston, Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of Market
Incentives for Corporate Environmental Performance (Vniv. of Pa. Ins!. For Law & Econ., Research Paper No.
05-16, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=725103.
64. See Neal Gunningham et a!., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go
Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004).
65. Consistent with my discussion infra, I will concede here that some of this impression is the result of
influence activity by interested parties. See, for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley publications page of the
PricewaterhouseCoopers website (www.pwcglobal.com). which contains numerous materials with titles such as
"Sarbanes-Oxley: How Will it Affect Nonprofits and Higher Education?"
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costs. That nonnative ambiguity begets uncertainty in how to comply.
At first glance, one might predict that companies would take advantage of this
ambiguity by construing the requirements in a narrow and self-serving way. But section
404, at least, requires auditors to attest, which gives the audit finns significant leverage.
In conventional economics tenns, the likely prediction would then be a Coasian bargain
between auditors and managers whereby control audits become more expensive but
preserve managerial autonomy in the most sensitive places. In particular, auditors might
focus their attention on time-consuming and revenue-generating tasks like operational
documentation and testing, but not the places where the risks of managerial opportunism
are greater. There is indeed anecdotal evidence of something like this happening.
That assumes, however, that managers and auditors are free to arrive at their selfserving bargain. Sarbanes-Oxley (and corporate and securities law generally) restrains
this conduct in a number of ways: first, by interposing others, such as independent
directors on the audit committee, the company's lawyers, etc., inside this process,66 so
that an opportunistic conspiracy is more difficult to sustain; second, and more powerfully,
by creating a much harsher criminal and civil liability threat if noncompliance is detected
by the SEC or federal prosecutors.
Managers can try to blunt these effects by lobbying Congress and the regulators
to back off of any aggressive enforcement. 67 Lobbying is how the accounting provisions
of the FCP A were rendered impotent for so long, and there is evidence that this effort is
to some extent currently underway. This approach, however, may be risky, especially if I
am right about the gradual creep of social nonns and expectations about institutional
behavior. When the discovery of cheating generates strong public and media attention, it
is hard to protect the cheaters; the tendency instead is for business people to tolerate
aggressive (perhaps even over-aggressive) tactics against a few unfortunate "bad apples"
lest further refonn efforts build. 68 And post-Sarbanes-Oxley, the tactics can indeed be
harsh. So there is reason for insiders to be anxious even when the signals from regulators
are momentarily friendly. The lingering fear might produce a relatively high level of
compliance.
But even this story doesn't capture all the likely effects of the uncertainty.
Corporate officers and directors have little direct familiarity with the law, especially as to
something as complicated as Sarbanes-Oxley. Precisely because of their ambiguity, the
internal controls provisions have to be interpreted for them, along with the level of
enforcement risk. What has ensued has been an aggressive level of rent-seeking by those
in a position to gain from an inflated construction of the Act's requirements, especially as
to internal controls. This inflation of the law's threat is likely not in bad faith. Given how
66. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using Attorney
Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517 (2003); Geoffrey C. Hazard & Edward
B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The Emergence of Independent Directors Counsel, 59 Bus. LAW.
1389, 1389-92 (2004).
67. The internal controls requirements are not directly enforceable via private securities litigation,
although there may be some "backdoor" mechanisms under both federal and state law that internal control
failures lead to private liability. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Implied Private Actions Under
Sarbanes-Oxley, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 775, 800-04 (2004).
68. See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the Expectations Gap in Investor Protection: The SEC and the
Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1139, 1142 (2003) (stating that the right response to scandal is
tough enforcement).
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open-ended the rules are, a person and group can readily construe them broadly (and in
professional contacts influence their peers to do the same) and come to believe in their
interpretation, which makes them all the more persuasive when transmitting their
message to the business community.
Auditors are certainly one group that-assisted by the SEC and the PCAOB-has
read the internal controls rules broadly and benefits considerably from doing so. Audit
fees are up sharply, and given the highly concentrated nature of the market for public
company audit services, profits presumably are as well. Although Sarbanes-Oxley
severely limits the non-audit services independent auditors can provide the issuer, there
remain some-risk management is one area-and so there still may be room for ancillary
fees. As we have just noted, auditors have considerable regulatory bargaining power visa-vis the issuer and its management to extract such rents, which is a considerable irony
given how much of the blame for the financial scandals was directed at the accounting
profession.
Attorneys have particular dominion over how the law is read and hence the power
to skew it in the direction of professional self-interest. 69 Many law firms aggressively
offer Sarbanes-Oxley compliance advice and implementation. Particularly interesting
here has been the extent to which non-corporate/securities lawyers have seized on the
Act's internal controls requirements. Many specialty areas (e.g., foreign trade, tax, health
care) have argued that expensive structural enhancements to the clients' legal compliance
efforts are needed to be "Sarbanes-Oxley compliant."
Management consultants are active, too, including many specialists in ethics,
compliance, and internal controls who have been in the market ever since the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and Caremark first bumped up the threat risk more
than a decade ago. And perhaps the most intriguing group of all to seize on the Act are
information technology professionals, who naturally see internal controls as largely an
information technology-based task and offer hardware, software, and expertise to
redesign those portions of the issuer's technology infrastructure to assist with information
security and surveillance. 70
Some of these interest groups are outsiders (like law firms, consultants, and
software vendors), but note that much of the rent-seeking influence activity will come
from inside the issuer. Information technology, internal audit, compliance, and legal
services departments, among others, can compete for internal resources using SarbanesOxley as leverage. This collective effort by those who stand to gain from internal controls
compliance can overwhelm the natural inclination by managers to go easy on internal
controls. Again, the auditors' leverage is clear, and the legal profession can gain
managers' attention by amplifying the signals about executives' personal liability risks if
they do not build a thorough enough system. Given the absence of any real enforcement
69. See Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 275
(1992) (commenting on rent-seeking and its limits); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert Rasmussen, Skewing the
Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 412 (l997)
(describing the impression that lawyers' "self interest would lead them to bias their advice in the direction of
undue caution").
70. See Eric Bellman, One More Cost of Sarbanes-Oxley: Outsourcing to India, WALL ST. J., July 14,
2005, at CI (describing a company's difficulties in deciding which parts of their operations it could outsource
while staying in compliance with the new law).
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thus far we do not really know how strictly the rules will really be enforced, but there are
still enough signals from regulators that internal controls are still a priority item, and we
are still too close in time to the scandals and the legislation for even sympathetic
regulators to back off too visibly. The most predictable response by managers, then, is
herd behavior 71 -100king around at what peers are doing and conforming so as not to
stand out as a tempting liability target. This effect means that once rent-seekers succeed
in getting one company to "upgrade," others can be sold more easily on the need to do the
same.
Although describing this activity as rent-seeking sounds cynical, this description
does not necessarily indicate whether the net consequences are good or bad. If, as
suggested earlier, management lacks sufficient incentives to implement internal financial
reporting controls on its own, then some push is needed and an assist from even selfinterested actors may be useful. Plainly, many innovations will be an improvement on the
status quo. But even when controls move in the proper direction, there may still be a
misallocation of control resources. The budgetary push will be for resource-intensive
efforts-spending on new technology, legal services, audit routines, and documentation.
The SEC and PCAOB have recently expressed concern that internal controls efforts have
become "bottom up" rather than "top down," focusing on routines and details deep within
the organization without enough attention to their overall strategic significance. 72 Such
labor-intensive formalism is not surprising given the interests of those paid to implement
the systems, but doesn't necessarily add the most value.
While this "bottom-up" focus does give some cause for pessimism, it should still
be tempered. Again, many changes will be bona fide improvements, and gradually,
managers under competitive pressure will learn to push back against those that are
patently wasteful, especially (as I predict) if the rules are not aggressively enforced. In
addition, I suspect that there will be some subtle but positive externalities with respect to
the norms of corporate accountability. As sociologist Lauren Edelman and her colleagues
have documented in their wide-ranging studies of corporate implementation of equal
employment opportunity regulation, compliance programs create the opportunity for
social norms to take deeper root inside the organization, competing with (though
probably never fully displacing) narrower conceptions of the firm's self-interest.?3 Some

71. See Paul DiMaggio & Walter Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organization Fields, 48 AM. SOc. REv. 147 (1983) (describing how coercive, mimetic, .
and normative processes lead to organizations becoming increasingly similar); Jeffrey Zwiebel, Corporate
Conservatism and Relative Compensation, 103 J. POL. ECON. I (1995) (explaining how managers' corporate
conservatism may lead them to "refrain from deviating from the herd"). For the view that fear and anxiety
produce "mimetic" behavior by senior executives, see Donald Hambrick et aI., Executive Job Demands: New
Insights for Explaining Strategic Decisions and Leader Behaviors, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 472, 479-80 (2005).
72. See DIV. OF CORPORATION FINANCE & OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMM'N, STAFF STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT'S REpORT ON INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL
REpORTING (May 16,2005), available at http://sec.gov/info/accountants/stafficreporting.pdf.
73. See Lauren B. Edelman et aI., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as
Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOc. 406 (1999); Lauren Edelman et aI., Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of
Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers' Dilemma, 13 LAW & POL'y 73 (1991); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal
Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531
(1992). For a good review of this and related literature, see Lauren Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal
Environment of Organizations, 23 ANN. REv. SOC. 479 (1997).
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of this behavior is a result of rent-see king-in the employment area, the laws empowered
human resource and compliance professionals, who then negotiated a larger place for
adherence to social expectations about due process and the right to be heard. Even though
there was too much formalism here, too, once such norms found a place inside the firm,
they became difficult to push aside entirely. Employees' sense of fair firm behavior
shifts, and expectations increase.
Though there are surely differences of degree in the social norms underlying
employment opportunity and managerial accountability, this may be Sarbanes-Oxley's
legacy as well. One competitive pressure that companies face is the need to attract and
keep a motivated workforce. Employees who are pressured to violate social norms that
they consider legitimate react with reduced motivation,74 exit, and, occasionally,
subversion in the form of whistle-blowing or otherwise. If I was right earlier that
expectations about institutional transparency and accountability are increasing, it will
become harder for managers to enlist cooperation by subordinates in an effort to cheat.
Sometimes the internal corporate culture will be strong enough to generate powerful
rationalizations, especially if the subordinates have a stake in the cheating as well (e.g.,
Enron),75 but such strong cultures are probably the exception, not the rule.
To be sure, this cultural shift in expectations pre-dates Sarbanes-Oxley and would
have an effect even in the absence of any legislation. The added impact of the Act and its
rules is two-fold. Together with the extraordinarily salient events surrounding itparticularly the implosion of companies like Enron, with so much collateral damage-it
is first a memorable objective lesson in the dangers of lack of accountability and an
expression of support for newer norms of institutional governance. 76 Second, it forces a
redesign of the architecture of internal controls that brings the processes more into the
open, with the involvement not only of compliance and audit professionals but a wider
variety of mid-level personnel inside the firm.77 The corporate sightlines are bound to be
better. AS-2 is clear, for example, that the system must be open and attentive to
expressions of employee doubts about the integrity of information or procedures. 78 This
open architecture means that there will be greater transparency inside the firm, which will
make it harder to hide things from those outside.
My sense, then, is that Sarbanes-Oxley will have some positive pay-off in terms
74. The work of Tom Tyler particularly emphasizes the role of employees' perceptions of social norms,
fairness, and entitlements as a constraint on what employers can demand. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Peter
Degoey, Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept
Decisions, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 331 (Roderick M. Kramer &
Tom R. Tyler eds., 1995).
75. See Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers
and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron's Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. I (2003)
(explaining psychological biases that influence internal decisions); cf Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the
Black Box of "Corporate Culture" in Law and Economics, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 80
(2006) (explaining adaptive features of internal biases).
76. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996) (explaining
law's impact in terms of expression of societal values).
77. Backer, supra note 3, at 427 (refers to the "panopticon" contemplated by Sarbanes-Oxley). On this
effect in real space, see Neal K. Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, III YALE L.J. 1039 (2002). On this
effect in cyberspace, see Neal K. Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 112 YALE L.J. 2261 (2003).
78. AS-2 supra note 26 para. 24. Whistle-blower protection is also enhanced by various provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley.
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of corporate transparency and accountability generally, in addition to the specific
improvements in the quality of financial reporting. Whether the costs will be worth it
depend, as we have discussed, on whom we specify as the intended beneficiaries of the
legislation. I am ambivalent so far as benefits to investors are concerned, especially in
light of the extensive rent-seeking to influence the design of the controls, but slightly
more optimistic if we take into account the broader social externalities.
VII.

SURVEILLANCE, NETWORKS, AND AN ASIDE ABOUT CORPORA TE LA W's ApPENDIX A

One curiosity in Clark's Corporate Law is Appendix A: "A Special Note on
Hierarchies."79 It is a fifteen page frolic and detour, replete with intricate graphics,
drawing from a wide range of social sciences (even archeology and anthropology) about
the comparative evolutionary fitness of hierarchical systems in the management of
organizations. It is mainly about information networks. For all its fascinating detail, it
makes a fairly simple and intuitive point: that the hierarchical form of authority, which
corporate law endorses by so centralizing power in the board of directors, is an efficient
mechanism for managing network information flow in a complex organization. 80 So far
as I can tell, this line of reasoning relates back to only one page in the main body of the
treatise. 81
The underlying idea, however, connects closely to Sarbanes-Oxley, because
internal controls are about hierarchies and information flow within organizations.
Appendix A focuses on formal information networks and their relationship to authority,
and suspect that these networks are what most internal controls designers pay attention to
as well. By contrast, I want to shift attention to informal networks-the communication
routes that emerge, often spontaneously, among officers, directors, managers, and
employees.
Since 1986, this has been a major academic research project, largely among
sociologists doing research in organizational behavior. Some of the work is highly
qualitative, other fairly mathematical. 82 The underlying idea is that individuals develop
lines of communication through which information flows separately from formal
processes, and that certain individuals will develop higher quality networks than others
by connecting to different places inside and outside the firm. A variety of techniques can
be used to identify individuals who possess traits, positions, or experiences that make
them particularly well-connected. 83 (As we all realize deep inside, it is who you know,
not just what you know). Some interesting work along this line relates to boards of
directors: there is reason to suspect that firms benefit in many ways by having directors
79.

CLARK, supra note 4, at 801-16.
80. See Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics oj Managing, 301. ECON. LITERATURE 1382 (1992)

(describing economics of hierarchical systems).
81. CLARK, supra note 4, at 24.
82. E.g., Kathleen Carley, A Comparison oj Artificial and Human Organizations, 31 1. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 175 (1996) (comparing and constrasting computational models of network behavior). The more
quantitative approach to the sociology of network behavior has been popularized in DUNCAN 1. WATTS, SIX
DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003). For a law-oriented use of networks material, see
Mitchell, supra note 33.
83. See generally Ajay Mehra, The Social Networks oj High and Low Self Monitors: Implications Jor
Workplace Performance, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 121 (2001).
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with certain network affiliations. 84
Intuitively, internal controls might well reach into the informal as well as the
formal network, which brings us to a point about surveillance and the "corporate
espionage" that Graham mentioned and Clark discusses. Surveillance technology has
evolved considerably, and with the advent of e-mail and other forms of digital
communication as primary network mechanisms, one could go quite deeply into the
informal network. This idea was emphasized in the aftermath of the public release by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission of a massive number of intra-firm e-mails from
Enron during the time period before the implosion. This release of emails has allowed
researchers to identify Enron's boundary-spanners and generate time-series images of the
frequency, direction, and intensity of communications, graphically portraying an increase
in anxiety well before the scandal became pUblic. 85 Commentators have noted the
obvious: to the extent that technology would allow surveillance of internal e-mails and
other digital communications on a real time basis, one might learn something of interest
as to risks and problems in a more timely fashion than via other forms of internal
controls. 86 In fact, this conclusion is essentially what governmental intelligence systems
try to do in the counter-terrorism area. 87
That leads to an interesting Sarbanes-Oxley thought experiment. Assume that this
technology were available at reasonable cost, and would elicit material information. What
would be the effect on internal behavior? The privacy issues are obvious; to me, this
thought experiment tests nicely our predictions with respect to the costs associated with
corporate monitoring and surveillance. Clark is right that employees expect some degree
of monitoring, so long as it is done evenly and fairly. But there is probably a line beyond
which the intrusion provokes reactive behavior and does diminish motivation, crowd out
trust, and chill communications. Autonomy is a powerful motivator, for both individuals
and groups. Without knowing where that line is, I would guess that the risks associated
with overly intrusive internal controls are at least more than remote.
VIII. CONCLUSION

As Clark suggests, Congress was correct to decide that an internal financial
reporting controls requirement benefits both investors and society (i.e., that market forces
alone do not suffice with respect to the integrity of information gathering and processing
inside the firm). The problem with Congress's reformulation of this requirement in
Sarbanes-Oxley is not the idea but the execution: by making a reasonableness standard
the only touchstone for compliance in the face of severe liability risk, the idea itself offers
84. See Ranjay Gulati & James Westphal, Cooperative or Controlling? The Effects oj CEO Board
Relations and the Content oj Interlocks on the Formation oj Joint Ventures, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 473 (1999)
(greater connectivity among directors leads to easier formation of joint ventures). On CEOs, see Michael
McDonald & James Westphal, Getting By with the Advice oJtheir Friends: CEO's Advice Networks and Firms'
Strategic Responses to Poor PerJormance, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. I (2003).
85. Jana Diesner et aI., Communication NetworksJrom the Enron E-Mail Corpus, II COMPUTATIONAL &
MATHEMATICAL ORG. THEORY 201 (2005).
86. See Gina Kolata, Enron Offers an Unlikely Boost to E-Mail Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005,
at C-l.
87. Though not on this particular strategy, both Cunningham and Backer, supra note 3, note the
similarities between Sarbanes-Oxley and government counter-terrorism efforts.
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no readily identifiable stopping point for deciding when the costs outweigh the benefits.
The potential benefits are significant but diffuse, as are so many of the costs. Seizing on
this uncertainty, many who stand to benefit from expenditures on internal controls have
amplified Sarbanes-Oxley's risks and demands, and pressured risk-averse managers and
directors into significant-and not always value-adding-investrnents. Some good is
done, including architectural renovations that create a more open internal design and
hence less opportunity for abuse, but many of the specific expenditures are wasteful,
increasing paperwork burdens and second-guessing of stable routines.
The problem is that nothing in the statute or the rules permits easy separation of
the valuable from the rent-seeking, and the political dynamics in the implementation of
the regulation, at least initially, favored the accountants and lawyers. More recently, the
regulators have sensed the problem and encouraged a more strategic, top-down approach
to compliance-which is to say, one less obsessed with the details of the firm's
informational infrastructure. 88 That is good, but still lacking in any well-articulated
theory of internal controls.
To me, the right theory takes us back to why we need legal intervention in the
first place, that is, why we don't trust managers' business judgment on internal controls?
The main reason is the principal-agent problem, the other is the concern that old systems
that once worked under different circumstances become locked-in. If so, then the
appropriate legal intervention would be one that targets these problems closely-focusing
the management report and external audit on those points within the system where there
is a particular risk that agency problems or path dependencies lead to flawed financial
reporting. That is a much tighter instruction than what we find in AS-2, which sends
management, lawyers, consultants, and auditors on a labor-intensive trek throughout the
firm in search of more-than-remote risks to address, and makes it likely that the reaction
will be additional personnel and paperwork.
A tightened focus would leave a larger portion of internal controls to
management's discretion, but this is not to say that it is out of the law's shadow entirely.
Actions against the company itself if the deficiencies lead to bad reporting have an
impact on senior executives, even if they did not know or recklessly disregarded the
truth. 89 Moreover, there are some negligence-based remedies that the SEC can pursue
(e.g., cease and desist) in the face of overly careless choices, which also have significant
reputational effects. And there are provisions like section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley-my
favorite provision-that authorize the recapture of bonuses, incentive compensation, and
insider trading profits of the top managers of the issuer anytime there is a restatement of
the financials due to personal misconduct, without specifying whose misconduct it has to
be. 9o

88. See supra note 72. SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins has called for a wholesale revision of AS-2 based
on these concerns. See Atkins Sees PCAOB Audit Standard as Root of 404 Implementation Issues, 38 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 827 (May 8, 2006).
89. E.g., Cindy Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence, 42
J.L. & ECON. 489 (1999) (explaining the reputational penalties assessed by the market, without the use of the
courts).
90. A reading of section 304 that requires that the executives themselves have committed the misconduct
would be odd, because there are ample restitutionary remedies already in that case. If the section is construed to
have significance, it would be read to recapture more-than-baseline compensation when misconduct occurs
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A focus on agency cost temptations would raise sensitivities, of course. A welldesigned system that uses agency cost incentives to determine where to allocate
surveillance resources could not be left in managers' hands (it really should be under the
audit committee's direction), and would have to give serious consideration to the
situational pressures-varying over time and circumstances-that make continued
success hard to sustain. A high stock price becomes a danger sign,91 as would a series of
successful quarters that outperform even "stretch" expectations, not necessarily a reason
for a celebratory round of bonuses and options for the high achievers. 92
Perhaps that would be such a focus' political undoing. We have to acknowledge
that the implementation of the internal controls requirement on a costly, bottom-up basis
is not only the product of rent-seeking by compliance advocates but a convenient way of
deflecting attention away from things that are more sensitive. 93 But this redirection is
necessary if internal controls are to have their desired pay-off. Good policy should shift
in this direction, but also be prepared with additional enforcement tools to respond to the
foreseeable discomfort and resistance.

under the executives' watch.
91. See generally Jensen, supra note 54.
92. See Langevoort, supra note 3, at 316.
93. This point is also made by Alles & Datar, supra note 3, at 132, observing that because section 404
does not distinguish well between the routine and the diagnostic, it "creates the potential danger that those
implementing 404 will focus more on the former, which are conceptually simpler if more numerous and
mechanical to implement, as opposed to the latter that require a fundamental rethink of incentive structures,
power relationships and the firm's culture." ld.
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